The Chetco Bar fire, near Brookings on Oregon鈥檚 south coast, simmered for weeks in the scars of previous fires in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness before breaking out in mid-August. As the fire raced across the landscape, driven by high winds, the firefighting effort came under growing criticism.
For a few weeks in late summer, Chetco Bar was the nation鈥檚 top priority fire. It burned in an area of more than 191,000 acres, forcing hundreds of people to evacuate and destroying several homes. It also 鈥� along with other major fires -- created unhealthy air quality over western Oregon and northern California. As the fire grew and the air thickened, tempers flared.
鈥淚t鈥檚 horrific. And there is no f#@%ing excuse for it whatsoever. The US Forest Service could have prevented this easily, and they didn鈥檛.鈥�
That鈥檚 Rogue River resident Ken Lewis. On his YouTube video blog, Lewis accused the Forest Service of allowing the Chetco Bar fire to burn as part of a liberal agenda. Conservative talk radio host Bill Meyer 鈥� at KMED in Medford 鈥� repeatedly blasted the Chetco Bar fire response.
鈥淚 have no doubt that the terrain where this started, the original quarter acre, is very difficult and possibly dangerous for on the ground. But it could have been taken care of back then with a few helicopter buckets. And then we would be talking about what a great summer we鈥檝e having.鈥�
Angry tweets and Facebook posts amplified the indignation.
This is the atmosphere Forest Service officials faced at a public meeting in Brookings on Sept. 28th. About 120 people showed up at the high school gym to hear what fire managers had to say.
Craig Trulock, with the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, denied the fire was deliberately allowed to burn.
鈥淛ust wanted to state right off, this was never a fire that we wanted,鈥� Trulock told the crowd. 鈥淵鈥檏now, this was a suppression fire. The decision was made within 15 minutes.鈥�
Fire officer Monty Edwards assumed command of the fire on July 13th, the day after it was first reported. Edwards said firefighters who rappelled into the remote scene struggled with steep, unstable slopes. He said it soon became clear the terrain was too treacherous to keep firefighters on the ground.
鈥淭he lack of safety zones and escape routes became really evident that we鈥檙e probably gonna get somebody hurt if we remain engaged like we are,鈥� he said.
The decision was made to pull back and figure out a better way to attack the fire. Edwards dismissed the claim that a few aerial water drops could have killed the fire early on.
鈥淭hey can鈥檛 do it alone with just aviation assets,鈥� he said. 鈥淵ou need someone the ground to go in direct and knock out the fire on the ground. That鈥檚 basic firefighting.鈥�
In fact, Edwards said, during the first day helicopters had dropped more than 50 buckets containing over 17,000 gallons of water.
Long-time Medford resident John Prendergast was on the national fire management team that took command on July 29th. Prendergast told the crowd at Brookings-Harbor High School that a rising toll of firefighter deaths has led to a national policy.
鈥淏efore we expose our wildland firefighters to the hazards found in the wildland fire environment, there has to be a reasonable probability of success, and that we鈥檙e not going to place their lives at an unacceptable risk.鈥�
Prendergast said that鈥檚 why crews were pulled back from direct engagement with the Chetco Bar fire. Instead, managers decided to build a containment line miles to the southwest, to cut off the fire if it moved toward Brookings. The plan was to deliberately burn from that line back toward the wildfire, creating a safe buffer.
But before that could happen, the weather shifted, triggering the hot, dry wind conditions known as the Chetco Effect. Prendergast said that was the game-changer.
鈥淥ur fire behavior analysts, they factored in the Chetco Wind Effect into the models and even with that, it greatly outpaced the model predictions of how that fire was going to grow,鈥� he said.
Starting August 15th, fanned by 45鈥搈ile-per-hour winds funneled down the Chetco River valley, the fire exploded. In five days it grew from 6,000 acres to more than 91,000, jumping the Chetco River and burning over the containment line meant to protect Brookings. Evacuations were ordered and the fire ultimately came within five miles of town before rain and cooler weather helped damp it down over the following weeks.
After the September 28th meeting in Brookings, few in the audience seemed mollified by the official explanations. Several people told JPR they鈥檇 received information that contradicted those accounts, but they wouldn鈥檛 identify their sources. Curry County Commissioner Court Boice鈥檚 skeptical response spoke for many.
鈥淭hey have a fairly convincing story that they tried to put the fire out early,鈥� he said. 鈥淎nd it鈥檚 very, very difficult for us to accept that as really the reality of what happened.鈥�
Boice said he鈥檚 pressing for a Congressional investigation into not only the handling of the Chetco Bar fire, but of federal forest policies he blames for wildfires across the West.
Kale Casey is with the incident management team on the Chetco Bar fire. Casey said he understands people鈥檚 anger over property losses. But he said the fire鈥檚 zero casualty rate proved the value of management鈥檚 focus on firefighter safety.
鈥淎s hard as it is to see those different families speak about their lost homes, we didn鈥檛 have to talk about mothers and fathers and grandparents losing their children out here working on the fire line,鈥� he said.
As autumn arrives and the ashes cool, arguments about wildfire policy are sure to heat up northwest state capitals 鈥� and Washington D.C. -- for some time to come.
